Do board characteristics moderate capital adequacy regulation and bank risk-taking nexus in Sub-Saharan Africa?

Abstract

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine whether board characteristics moderate the relationship between capital adequacy regulation and bank risk-taking of universal banks in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).Design/methodology/approachThe paper uses 700 bank-year observations of universal banks in SSA between 2009 and 2019. The paper further uses the two-step generalized method of moments as the baseline estimator.FindingsThe paper finds that capital adequacy regulation is positively related to overall bank and liquidity risks. Nonetheless, capital adequacy regulation increases credit risk in the sampled banks. The paper further reports that board characteristics individually and significantly moderate the relationship between capital adequacy regulation and risk-taking.Practical implicationsThe findings have implications for regulators of universal banks that board characteristics matter for capital adequacy regulation to impact risk-taking behavior.Originality/valueThe paper extends the existing literature on the effect of board characteristics on the capital adequacy regulations and risk-taking behavior nexus of universal banks.