Can competitors cooperate? The impact of formal institution agents in promoting coopetition among emerging market exporters

Abstract

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the effects of formal institution agents on export performance, mediated by coopetition. It presents novel scales for evaluating firms’ adherence to cooperation agreements with competitors, identifying coopetition networks’ main motives and goals. The study also focuses on the relationship between the export performance of small and medium enterprises from emerging markets and coopetition strategies. Design/methodology/approach The study adopts a quantitative methodology using multivariate and confirmatory methods. The sample comprised 166 firms from three different industries in an emerging market (Brazil). Findings The results indicate that adherence to formal institution agents promotes cooperation among competitors and that such coopetition tends to improve export performance. The role played by formal institution agents minimizes the paradoxical tension and fosters coopetitive performance. Firms in developing markets look to mediated coopetition to achieve coopetitive advantages. They cooperate to create collective advantages from shared resources, but they do not lose sight of the ultimate objective of appropriating these advantages. The cycle of creation and appropriation of advantages is fostered by the formal institution agent, acting as the conductor of an orchestra, coordinating movements and setting the rhythm for the partners. The institutional agent, thus, constitutes an important hub of the coopetition network. Originality/value The paper contributes to understanding a type of coopetition that has hitherto been underexplored in the literature – mediated coopetition.