Global financial regulatory reforms and sovereign’s exemption

Abstract

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to underline the (hidden) risks posed after the crisis by the exemption of non-financial operators, especially sovereigns, from the regulatory reforms of over the counter (OTC) derivatives undertaken by G20 countries in the absence of accounting data on trading. Design/methodology/approach Recent financial regulatory improvements are reported to underline that the trading of OTC derivatives by sovereigns and local administrations does not take place under the new regulatory umbrella, because of the relative size of the institution, the lack of incentives to adhere to Centralized Counterparty Systems (CCPs) and most of all, the absence of proper accounting rules. Sovereigns and local administrations have the potential to undermine global financial stability. Findings The limited availability of accounting data on derivatives’ use by public administrations constitutes a barrier towards a full comprehension of risks involved. Sovereigns should be compelled to adhere to the CCPs and the collateralized system of trading; the short-term costs of adhering to CCPs are worth $20bn. Research limitations/implications The new regulatory system failed to explicitly consider the trading of sovereigns and this can reduce the effectiveness of regulation itself and can have negative impact on financial stability; in fact, omitting sovereigns from these regulations represent a significant risk oversight because they are systemically important players, although with a special political power. Originality/value Despite progress made in improving the transparency and resilience of OTC derivative markets after the subprime crisis, sovereigns and public administrations are exempted from the new regulation, posing severe risks to financial stability.