Do changes in distributors' incentive structure drive mutual fund flows?

Abstract

PurposeThis study estimates the impact of changes in the mutual fund distributor incentive structure on distributor-advised mutual fund flows. The authors employ two recent major policy interventions by the Indian self-regulatory authority and the financial market regulator – one partial ban and another complete ban on upfront commissions – paid to mutual fund distributors on distributor-advised mutual fund flows.Design/methodology/approachThe authors use novel distributor-level data across the 198 largest distributors in India between 2013 and 2020 and a series of pooled panel random-effect generalized least squares models with robust standard errors to explore the effect of changes of distributor commissions on distributor assets-under-management (AUM), gross sales, commissions and changes (%) in the number of investors in alternate investment avenues like portfolio management services (PMS).FindingsChanges in the incentive structure have a significant negative effect on mutual fund flows at an aggregate level and within MF distributor categories. A significant diversion of investor funds toward PMS is noted, which paid higher upfront commissions to distributors during the same period.Practical implicationsThe authors posit that these two developments are not mutually independent and that both fall out of the aforementioned policy changes by Securities and Exchange Board of India and Association of Mutual Funds in India. The study findings have implications for all stakeholders in the Indian mutual fund industry and, by extension, for Indian and global alternative investment avenues.Originality/valueThis study is the first to explore the effects of these two major policy interventions by regulators on mutual fund flows in India.