The effect of the dependence on the work of other auditors on error in analysts’ earnings forecasts

Abstract

Purpose This paper aims to examine the effect of audit quality of consolidated financial statements on the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts from the viewpoint of users of financial statements. Design/methodology/approach This paper investigates the effect of dependence on the work of other auditors on error in analysts’ earnings forecasts based on samples from 2011 to 2012 (the period since implementation of the International Financial Reporting Standards in Korea). In addition, this paper examines the effects of use of Big 4 auditors, use of auditors with industry expertise and the proportion of overseas subsidiaries in relation to all subsidiaries on the association between dependence on the work of other auditors and error in analysts’ earnings forecasts. Findings This paper finds a positive relation between dependence on the work of other auditors and error in analysts’ earnings forecasts, suggesting that more dependence on the work of other auditors decreases the quality of the audit of consolidated financial statements; thus, to the extent that low-quality audits decrease reporting reliability, analysts’ forecasts are less likely to be accurate. This paper also finds that the positive relationship between dependence on the work of other auditors and error in analysts’ earnings forecasts is weakened when the principal auditor is a Big 4 auditor or one with industry expertise, because such auditors provide higher-quality audit services. However, the positive relationship between dependence on the work of other auditors and error in analysts’ earnings forecasts is further strengthened in cases where the proportion of overseas subsidiaries to all subsidiaries is higher. These results suggest that the complexity of the consolidation process increases as the proportion of overseas subsidiaries increases. Originality/value The findings are useful in analyzing the effects of adoption of the New ISA, implemented in 2014, which does not allow the division of audit responsibilities between principal auditors and other auditors. This paper also provides insights for regulators and practitioners to improve the auditor appointment system in the future.