Effect of ownership concentration on capital structure: evidence from the MENA region

Abstract

Purpose – This paper aims to document how does ownership concentration, a proxy for agency conflicts, affect capital structure of firms in emerging markets. Agency relationship between insiders and outsiders has the potential to influence corporate decision-making which, in turn, impacts firm characteristics such as leverage. Design/methodology/approach – This paper uses pooled regression analysis to document the effect of ownership concentration on capital structure in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region (Morocco, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain), during the period between 2005 and 2009. Findings – The authors show that ownership concentration negatively affects capital structure. The results also show that for a given level of ownership concentration, the proportion of debt in capital structure goes up as information asymmetries decrease. Finally, the results show that for a given ownership concentration, it is the growth firms with low information asymmetries that have a higher proportion of debt in capital structure. Research limitations/implications – The authors argue that information asymmetries associated with ownership concentration minimize the ability of firms to raise debt, thereby resulting in a negative relationship between ownership concentration and capital structure. Furthermore, reluctance on the part of controlling shareholders to accumulate excess leverage to minimize non-diversifiable risk also negatively influences capital structure. Originality/value – Most of the prior studies on the relationship between ownership concentration and capital structure have been conducted in relatively more developed markets. An important market that has failed to attract attention regarding this issue is the MENA. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap by documenting the relationship between the two in the MENA region.