Determinants of CoCo issuance: liquidity and risk incentives

Abstract

Purpose This paper aims to study the impact of (regulatory and nonregulatory) liquidity on contingent convertible (CoCo) issuance and the relationship between CoCos and asset quality. Design/methodology/approach The analysis of this study comprises two stages. In the first stage, the authors used a logit model to test whether banks with riskier assets as well as lower solvency and (regulatory and nonregulatory) liquidity are more likely to issue CoCos. In the second stage, the authors used univariate analysis and fixed effects regression to measure the impact of Additional Tier 1 (AT1) CoCos on the quality of the issuer’s assets. Findings The study shows that regulatory liquidity ratios are negatively related to CoCo issuance. This study also finds that the likelihood to issue CoCo is higher when banks have lower regulatory capital or are less risky. Asset quality is found to not change significantly after the issuance. All in all, these results suggest that while solvency regulation is primarily regarded as the main motivation for CoCo issuance, liquidity regulation also matters. Research limitations/implications Despite the fact that CoCos have been emerging as an alternative way to help banks meet regulatory capital requirements, the paper argues that the relation between liquidity regulation and CoCos should be taken into account. Originality/value This study presents an empirical analysis on the CoCos instrument, focusing on the relationship between AT1 CoCos and liquidity regulation. Therefore, it serves to fill a gap in the literature on the underlying forces behind CoCo issuance. Moreover, this study measures the impact of AT1 CoCos issuance on bank risk, particularly on the quality of the issuer’s assets.