Political and financial background in board interlocking and earnings management in Brazil

Abstract

Purpose Although board interlocking underlying forces are largely hidden, the purpose of this paper is to provide managers, auditors, analysts, regulators and other stakeholders with sociological board interlocking information considering the different backgrounds of their members. Design/methodology/approach The research sample gathered 1,606 observations from 2010 to 2017. For data analysis, the direct and indirect board interlocking linkages, considering the different backgrounds of board members, established the centrality indicators. Subsequently, the authors used these indicators according to each measured background in the regression models. Findings The results indicate that the political background of board interlocking members is positively related to real earnings management practices, while the financial background has a mitigating effect on such practices. Research limitations/implications The findings suggest that individual skills and interests conveyed across the corporate social network have shaped corporate governance, with distinct impacts on the quality of accounting information. Practical implications The authors conclude that both backgrounds could have implications on agency conflicts, increasing (policy) or reducing (financial) information asymmetry between the company and its various stakeholders, which indicates that the authors must consider sociological and not just economic aspects within corporate governance. Social implications The sociological background of individuals is necessary for the congruence of monitoring mechanisms, and consequently, the quality of accounting information. Originality/value This study examines the influence of the political and financial background of board interlocking members on real earnings management practices in Brazilian publicly traded companies in the International Financial Reporting Standards post-adoption period.