Author:
Abdel-Meguid Ahmed,Samaha Khaled,Dahawy Khaled
Abstract
Purpose
– This exploratory study aims to provide preliminary evidence regarding the non-audit committee corporate governance determinants of audit committee functionality.
Design/methodology/approach
– The study is based on archival accounting, corporate governance data, and interviews of subjects of the top 100 companies listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX100). A logistic regression is used to identify the non-audit committee governance attributes that affect the likelihood of of having a functional audit committee.
Findings
– Board size and board independence, (CEO-chairman duality) are positively (negatively) related to audit committee functionality, suggesting complementary governance relations. On the other hand, the authors document a negative relation between auditor type (Big4) and audit committee functionality indicating a substitutive governance effect.
Originality/value
– To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first study that explores the actual functioning of audit committees in Egypt beyond mere regulatory requirements. The study highlights the importance of assuring that the “spirit” of corporate governance laws and regulations is adhered to rather than the mere compliance with their “letter”.
Subject
Business, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous)
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