Author:
Liu Dehai,Xu Weijun,Li Hongyi,Zhang Weiguo,Wang Weiguo
Abstract
PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to understand the root cause of a large number of quality problems in the current Chinese construction market.Design/methodology/approachInformation economics theory is used to analyze the cause of construction quality problems related to the specific case of the Wenchuan earthquake of China.FindingsThe single low price competition in the construction tender market leads to the serious adverse selection and moral hazard behavior of bidding firms. The main solution to this problem is the introduction and improvement of an independent inspection/supervision mechanism.Originality/valueThe paper systematically analyzes the evaluation method of the lowest price winning bidding policy, which is the fundamental cause of adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the Chinese construction market.
Subject
Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health,Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law,Health (social science)
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