The intercultural ethics agenda from the point of view of a moral objectivist

Abstract

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to attempt to resolve some unclarity about the nature and character of intercultural information ethics (IIE).Design/methodology/approachBy survey of some of the relevant literature, the paper identifies and explains the distinctive projects of IIE. In addition, to facilitate the achievement of these projects, the paper attempts to identify the most fruitful metaphysical and meta‐ethical assumptions about truth and moral truth. In particular, to identify and determine which of objectivist theories of truth and morality or intersubjectivist theories of truth and morality provides a better theoretical foundation for IIE.FindingsTwo projects are identified: a descriptive project and a normative project. It is argued that moral objectivism provides a better foundation for the normative (project than moral intersubjectivism (or, as it is sometimes called, normative cultural relativism) in the sense that objectivism provides a more solid ground for the principle grounding the normative project – namely that agreement among cultures on principles of information ethics is good or desirable. In other respects, it is concluded that moral objectivism and moral intersubjectivism do equally well in grounding the normative project.Originality/valueThe paper is the first to compare the two methodological approaches and points in the direction of the most fruitful approach to take in pursuing IIE.