Ownership structure, board characteristics and dividend policy: evidence from Turkey

Abstract

Purpose This study aims to investigate the impact of ownership structure and board characteristics on dividend policy in the listed Turkish firms between 2013 and 2019. Design/methodology/approach This study uses the probability of paying dividends, dividend payout ratio and dividend yield measures. The suitable regression procedures (logit, probit and Tobit models) are used to examine the research hypotheses by focusing on a panel data set drawn from the Borsa Istanbul (BIST) 100 index, excluding financial and utility firms. Findings The empirical findings indicate that institutional and concentrated ownerships are significant and positively associated with dividend payouts, whereas family ownership does not influence dividend policy. On the other end, board size is positive, while chief executive officer duality is negatively related to dividend policy. Additionally, the female directors and board independence are insignificant in influencing firms to pay high dividends. Research limitations/implications Future researchers can validate this paper’s findings by considering the stock dividends as well. Additionally, future researchers may investigate the relationship between these constructs by extending the sample size of firms listed on BIST or in other emerging markets. Practical implications This study’s findings may serve policymakers, regulators, investors and academic researchers to get valuable guidance from relevant literature. The Turkish firms may improve dividend policy by implementing the regulatory framework introduced by the Capital Markets Law in 2012 for effective monitoring and protecting the minority shareholders’ rights. The controlling shareholders may alleviate principal-principal conflicts by ensuring the independence of directors and increasing the number of female directors according to the critical mass of at least 30% of board members. Originality/value This study contributes to agency theory and signaling theory by considering ownership structure and board attributes among Turkish firms related to dividend payments.