Diversification, corporate governance, regulation and bank risk-taking

Abstract

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of diversification, corporate governance and capital regulations on bank risk-taking in Asian emerging economies. Design/methodology/approach The authors applied the generalized method of moments to analyze a sample of 116 listed banks of ten Asian emerging economies for the years 2010–2018. Findings The authors found that diversification, board size, CEO duality and board independence, block holders and capital regulations significantly affect bank risk-taking. In particular, nontraditional income sources such as noninterest income and adoption of diversification strategies minimize bank risk-taking. Practical implications It is expected that the outcomes of this study can be used by banks in Asian emerging economies that seek to reduce risk-taking by managing the diversification of their income streams and managing the impacts of capital regulation and implementing sound corporate governance features in monitoring their operations. This study suggests practical risk minimizing strategies for banks. First is the sourcing of nontraditional income and adoption of diversification strategies. Second, maintaining nonexecutive directors on the board would enhance monitoring of business activities. Third, maintaining deposit insurance would reduce bank’s risk. Government provides insurance to depositors to motivate them to deposit their funds into the banks. This, in return, facilitates banks to overcome risk. However, banks need to be cautious of any increase in capital ratio, as channeling funds into risky investments would increase risk. Originality/value This study is the first to investigate the impacts of corporate governance, diversification and regulation on bank’s risk-taking in a cross-country setting of ten Asian emerging economies.