Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to examine how a firm’s exposure to economic policy uncertainty affects the auditors’ perceptions of financial reporting risk. Firms that are more sensitive to policy uncertainty are predicted to engage in more earnings management because these firms are more likely to experience greater uncertainty in future operations. Audit fees will reflect this reporting risk. On the other hand, auditors might feel more fee pressure from policy-sensitive firms because firms are more inclined to reduce spending in the face of uncertainty and subsequently charge lower fees.
Design/methodology/approach
The author tests my hypothesis using U.S. data on audit fees and client characteristics of public companies between the years 2001 and 2021. The author estimates a standard audit fee model based on the audit fee literature (Hay et al., 2006) while also including the two policy sensitivity measures. This study uses panel data methods that allow time-series analyses, providing a powerful setting to test dynamic audit fee adjustment to improve the understanding of the audit market.
Findings
The results suggest that audit fee is higher for policy-sensitive firms than for policy-neutral firms. These results are robust to various proxies of policy sensitivity and various specifications designed to mitigate the endogeneity concerns. The study provides assurance that on average, auditor pricing reflects client risk adequately, mitigating the concern that auditors give in to fee pressure and compromise audit quality as a result.
Research limitations/implications
While the findings from this study should be of value to regulators and academics seeking to understand audit activities amid escalating macroeconomic uncertainty, when interpreting these results, several limitations must be considered. The study does not examine how external auditors evaluate risks tied to policy uncertainty. A comprehensive understanding of how and why external auditors respond to heightened policy uncertainty faced by firms could be better achieved through interviews with external auditors and audit committee members. In addition, while this study posits that auditors adjust their approach in response to changes in policy uncertainty, largely due to potential shifts in the risks of material misstatement, there might be additional factors at play that warrant higher audit fees post a change in policy uncertainty. For instance, specific policy changes may give rise to new risks or modify existing ones, thereby precipitating increased scrutiny of records and procedures as company directors’ demand. These aspects offer potential avenues for future research.
Practical implications
This study underscores the significant role of policy sensitivity in determining audit fees and audit quality. Policy-sensitive firms present unique complexities and potential risks that require additional effort and vigilance from auditors. Auditors must develop a specialized understanding of sectors prone to policy fluctuations to navigate these unique challenges effectively. In addition, the role of professional standards boards and regulators in establishing guidelines for auditing policy-sensitive firms cannot be understated. Such guidelines could lead to more consistent audit practices and improved audit quality. Finally, by recognizing and effectively responding to the policy sensitivity of client firms, audit firms can mitigate their own risks, strengthen public trust and enhance the reliability of financial reports.
Originality/value
First, this study adds to an emerging stream of auditing literature that focuses on how audit fees interact with a firm’s external environment by providing evidence of an unexplored implication, a firm-specific policy sensitivity. Second, my main construct, policy sensitivity, provides two distinct advantages over other variables used in prior studies that explore the relationship between audit fees and external firm environments. Third, this study answers the calls for research by De Villiers et al. (2013, p. 3), who identified the cost behavior of audit fees, especially over time, as an area not well understood.
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