Author:
Tsai Ming-Tien,Tung Wen-Hui
Abstract
Purpose
– This study aims to explore the effects of corporate governance structure and resources on foreign direct investment (FDI) commitment and firm performance.
Design/methodology/approach
– The data are collected from high-tech firms listed by the Taiwan Stock Exchange. All selected 137 firms have complete FDI and other required data during 2007-2009. The mean values of the variables during the three-year period were used for analysis.
Findings
– The results indicate that both chief executive officer (CEO) duality and government shareholding affect a firm’s FDI; and the higher the management shareholding ratio, the lower the return on equity. Moreover, a large ownership of substantial shareholders can enhance a firm’s performance; and higher institutional ownership can lead to higher firm performance.
Research limitations/implications
– This study analyses the limited data from 137 high-tech firms in Taiwan during the three-year period of 2007-2009. Further analyses of other industries, countries and time periods are needed to generalize the conclusions.
Practical implications
– A firm with CEO duality should increase the ratio of government holding to mitigate the influence of CEO on FDI decisions. When a firm’s performance is poor, the ratio of managerial holdings should be reduced; conversely, the firm could attract more holdings from domestic securities and funds to improve performance.
Originality/value
– This study provides guidelines for shareholders to analyze governance structure and formulate their investment strategies. Corporate policymakers may use these as the principles for designing a corporate governance structure that could engender optimal firm performance.
Subject
General Business, Management and Accounting
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