Small arms procurement and corruption in small NATO countries

Abstract

Purpose The study aims to assess military procurement strategy in NATO countries labelled as emerging markets (Czechia, Slovakia and Lithuania) and capitalist Norway, which vary in national culture as indicated by the Hofstede Culture Compass. Design/methodology/approach This comparative case study analyses the procurement of a simple, mass-produced, off-the-shelf military product (FN Herstal MINIMI gun) in four small but very economically free countries from 2008 to 2023. The study answers the research question of how the unit price of MINIMI guns varies across post-communist and historical NATO countries distinguished by the variables operationalising national culture. Findings The general disability of the government to control corruption deviates the strategy of military procurement in post-communist defence institutions from an effective strategy of liberal capitalism, minimising the unit price and risks (Norway), to an odd strategy maximising the unit price and risks by preferring middlemen as agent of hidden agenda (Czechia). Research limitations/implications Some defence institutions in post-communist countries may be burdened by legislature capture, and detailed research is needed to determine this. Practical implications The authors argue that national culture may contribute to significant goal displacement in the procurement strategy adopted by the government in an economically liberal state. Social implications Without perfecting the control of corruption in post-communist defence institutions, the NATO burden-sharing debate on 2% of GDP will remain controversial. Originality/value With variables characterising national culture and the government’s ability to control corruption, the study elucidates a slow pace of convergence of post-communist countries to NATÓs values and procedures.