Corporate governance and underpricing of small and medium enterprises IPOs in India

Abstract

Purpose The purpose of the paper is to examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms, i.e. board structure and ownership structure on the underpricing of small and medium enterprises (SME) IPOs in India. Design/methodology/approach Most of the extant empirical research studies have either pivoted on mainstream IPOs or SMEs IPOs in developed economies, but the present study examines 200 SME IPOs issued during Feb 2012 to April 2017. Multiple regressions have been used to examine the impact of the corporate governance mechanisms on raw return (RR). Furthermore, robustness of the results has been verified through the employment of market-adjusted excess return (MAER) as an additional proxy of underpricing. Findings The results highlight that board size, inverse of board committees, board independence, board age, board directorships positively, and top ten shareholding negatively influence RR. Further, direction of promoter ownership variable indicates curvilinear relationship with underpricing. Other explanatory variables used in model lack statistical validity. Similar results have been obtained when variables were regressed against MAER with related board members being additionally significant in model. Practical implications The findings suggest that Indian investors do take cues from board structure and ownership patterns for making investment decisions in small- and medium-sized firms. Further, the results are also helpful to top management in structuring their boards. Originality/value The present research enriches SME IPOs underpricing literature because the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on unadjusted returns is relatively under explored particularly within the context of small- and medium-sized firms.