The evolution of corporate governance and agency control: the effectiveness of mechanisms in creating value for companies with IPO on the Brazilian stock exchange

Abstract

Purpose From the agency theory’s point of view, this paper aims to analyze corporate governance mechanisms about the characteristics of the companies quoted in the segments Bovespa Mais and Bovespa Mais 2 and their influence on the creation of value in preparation for the opening of the initial public offering (IPO). Design/methodology/approach A quantitative approach was adopted to achieve the proposed objective using the panel data with fixed effects and secondary data collected on the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários website, using statistical software Stata® 13.0 for statistical tests. The population comprises non-financial companies belonging to the Bovespa Mais and Bovespa Mais Level 2 groups, as the survey sample took into account the period of adhesion of the companies, totaled in 15 companies, which cover the period from 2008 to 2019. The selected variables correspond to the ownership structure’s characteristics, then the board’s composition and the fiscal council as the body responsible for supervising the administrators’ acts. Findings The main results indicate that the number of independent members on the board of directors and the supervisory board’s participation positively influence market performance. However, it also reveals that the concentration of ownership brings fundraising for other companies’ acquisitions, risk reduction concerning information asymmetry between investing powers. Research limitations/implications The main results indicate that the number of independent members on the board of directors and the supervisory board’s participation positively influence market performance. Despite this, it also reveals that the concentration of ownership brings fundraising for other companies’ acquisitions, risk reduction concerning information asymmetry between investing powers. Practical implications This paper advances a comparative institutional perspective to explain capital market choice by firms making an IPO in a foreign market. This paper finds that internal governance characteristics (founder-chief executive officer, executive incentives and board independence) and external network characteristics (prestigious underwriters, degree of venture capitalist syndication and board interlocks) are significant predictors of foreign capital market choice by foreign IPO firms. Social implications While product market choices have been central to strategy formulation for firms in the past, financial markets’ integration makes capital markets an equally crucial strategic decision. This paper advances a comparative institutional perspective to explain capital market choice by firms making an IPO in a foreign market. Originality/value This situation generates value to shareholders and is perceived by the market and, ultimately, generates a direct relationship with the market performance of companies. While product market choices have been central to strategy formulation for firms in the past, financial markets’ integration makes capital markets an equally major strategic decision.