Managing risk in mergers and acquisitions activity: beyond ‘good’ and ‘bad’ management

Abstract

Purpose – This paper aims to assess the impact of the presence/absence of risk management practices on the risk of merger and acquisition (M&A) failure. Design/methodology/approach – An agency theoretic perspective is adopted, along with a mixed-methods approach to study managerial complexity beyond simply “good” and “bad”. The focus is on an agency conflicts. Findings – The authors first present an integrated framework that classifies managerial behaviour and risk management, where M&A bids can become vehicles for maximising managerial benefits rather than shareholder value. The authors proceed to consider M&A activity that benefits both managers and shareholders in the presence of risk management strategies. Research limitations/implications – The paper highlights the benefits of multiple paradigms and research paths that address dimensions captured by an agency theoretic perspective. Practical implications – The authors regard this paper as having particular significance in that the global financial crisis has impacted M&A activities and objectives, shifting the employment and related risks faced by managers. Originality/value – The paper suggests future research paths to advance the understanding of the complex behaviour of managers involved in M&A activities that go beyond the classification of “good” and “bad” managers.