Another Perspective on Credit Risk Transfer and Asset Securitization

Abstract

Although issuers may benefit generally from securitization, some asset securitizations transfer more credit risk than others. When a lender uses securitization to replace on‐balance‐sheet financing, that lender transfers to investors some of the risks, and, in the form of credit enhancements, some of the offsetting, i.e., claims‐paying, economic resources (e.g., assets, cashflows), as well. Therefore, securitization only reduces an issuer's net (i.e., residual) exposure to credit losses when a securitization has transferred proportionately more credit risk than claims‐paying assets. The authors discuss the distinction between “gross” versus “net” transfers of credit risk. To illustrate this point, they provide conceptual examples of the net effect of an asset securitization on the residual credit risk retained by an issuer. In these examples, providing credit enhancement (e.g., overcollateralization, subordination) may implicitly lever or delever an issuer's balance sheet. The authors outline the general conditions under which this indirect economic recourse to the issuer, in effect a form of “self‐insurance,” may result in a net dilution of the claims of unsecured creditors.