Is capital conservation buffer or regulatory leverage better at improving bank efficiency? The case of an emerging market

Abstract

Purpose This paper is motivated by the heated debates preceding the introduction of additional regulatory requirements of Basel III on capital conservation buffer (CCB) and regulatory leverage (RLEV) in banks of emerging markets. The paper aims to examine which policy ratio can improve bank efficiency (BE), in one of the most resilient banking settings in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Design/methodology/approach The analysis is performed on a sample of 13 banks for the period 2010–2018 in Egypt and proceeds in two steps. In the first step, the data envelopment analysis model is used to derive bank-specific efficiency scores. In the second step, BE scores are regressed on the two types of regulatory capital and a set of control variables. Findings The paper is motivated by regulatory debates on the viability of RLEV and CCB in enhancing BE. The results show that higher RLEV and CCB are associated with a reduction in BE and that RLEV is highly associated with BE compared to CCB. Hence, results are relevant to policymakers in designing measures for improving BE in emerging markets. Originality/value The findings contribute to a small but growing stream of research on capital adequacy in emerging markets. This study provides results on the viability of risk-based vs non-risk-based capital requirements. The findings are also relevant to bank regulators in similar emerging market settings in their efforts to introduce and phase in minimum leverage requirements according to Basel III.