The influence of effort level on profit distribution strategies in IPD projects

Abstract

PurposeConstruction projects have become increasingly long, complex and costly with waste and inefficiencies and often fail to achieve the desired results. Integrated project delivery (IPD) is believed to change these problems. A reasonable and fair profit distribution mechanism is a critical factor for ensuring the success of the IPD projects. This study aims to investigate the strategies of all participants in the profit distribution of an IPD project with respect to the factor of the effort level.Design/methodology/approachThis study describes the influence of owners and participants on profit distribution due to their respective efforts in the IPD project alliance. The influence of effort level on profit distribution is discussed based on the Holmstrom-Milgrom model of asymmetric information game theory and principal-agent theory, combined with incentive compatibility (IC) constraints and individual rationality (IR) constraints.FindingsThe results show that the optimal level of effort by each participant optimizes the profit distribution of an IPD project. At the same time, in the revenue incentive contract, the effort level of the participants is positively correlated with the profit distribution, proportional to their contribution coefficient and inversely proportional to the square of the cost of their creative activities in terms of effort. Each party of an IPD project can adopt a series of measures to improve their own effort level and choose the optimal level of effort based on the profit distribution, while satisfying their own utility maximization.Originality/valueThis study introduces the Holmstrom-Milgrom model in the principal-agent theory to explore the influence of the effort level on profit distribution in IPD projects. The quantitative model can contribute to establish a fair and efficient profit distribution scheme for the IPD projects.