One-woman director mandate and earnings quality: role of financial expertise and woman presence on the audit committee

Abstract

PurposeThe study examines the impact of a recent mandate (Section 149 of the Indian Companies Act, 2013, where firms of a certain size are mandated to appoint at least one woman director on the board) on the earnings quality of firms. The study also examines the role of financial expertise and the presence of a woman director in the audit committee on the association between mandate and earnings quality.Design/methodology/approachTaking leverage of a quasi-natural experiment in India, the authors employ the ‘Difference-in-Difference’ (DiD) technique. DiD enables the author to filter out the impact of concurrent exogenous shocks while examining the issue. The propensity score matching and entropy balancing techniques have been employed to overcome the problem of endogeneity and self-selection bias.FindingsBased on the sample of 538 Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) listed firms, the author finds that magnitude of discretionary accruals has decreased among test firms (firms mandated to comply with Section 149) relative to benchmark marks (firms not mandated to comply with Section 149) during the post-legislation period, indicating the improved earning quality after the mandate. This finding is consistent with the notion of social role theory that women are less likely to be engaged in risky activities such as earnings management. Further, the author find that the financial expertise of the woman and presence of the woman on the audit committee strengthen the positive impact of the mandate on earnings quality. These results are robust to alternative measurements of discretionary accruals.Originality/valueThe study is among the pioneering attempts to make use of a quasi-natural experiment and investigate the impact of a woman director on earnings quality. The study is also one of the few studies to focus on a developing country like India having a culture dominated by men.