The functional background of the compensation committee chair: the choice and weight of performance measures in CEO compensation

Author:

Kalelkar RachanaORCID,Nwaeze Emeka

Abstract

PurposeThe authors analyze the association between the functional background of the compensation committee chair and CEO compensation. The analysis is motivated by the continuing debate about the reasonableness of executive pay patterns and the growing emphasis on the role of compensation committees.Design/methodology/approachThe authors define three expert categories—accounting, finance, and generalist—and collect data on the compensation committee (CC) chairs of the S&P 500 firms from 2008 to 2018. The authors run an ordinary least square model and regress CEO total and cash compensation on the three expert categories.FindingsThe authors find that firms in which the CC chair has expertise in accounting, finance, and general business favor performance measures that are more aligned with accounting, finance, and general business, respectively. There is little evidence that CC chairs who are CEOs of other firms endorse more generous pay for the host CEO; the authors find some evidence that CC chairs tenure relative to the host CEO's is negatively associated with the level of the CEO's pay.Research limitations/implicationsThis study suggests that firms and regulators should consider the background of the compensation committee chair to understand the variations in top executive.Practical implicationsCompanies desiring to link executive compensation to particular areas of strategy must also consider matching the functional background of the compensation committee chair with the target strategy areas. From regulatory standpoint, requiring compensation committees to operate independent of inside directors can reduce attempts by inside directors to skim the process, but a failure to also consider the impact of compensation committees' discretion over the pay-setting process can distort the executives' pay-performance relation.Originality/valueThis is the first study to examine the effects of the functional background of the compensation committee chair on CEO compensation.

Publisher

Emerald

Subject

Finance,Accounting

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