Private brand introduction and selling mode decision when considering risk aversion

Abstract

PurposeThis paper aims to study the interplay between a risk-averse national brand manufacturer's (NBM) selling mode decision and a risk-neutral e-platform's private brand (PB) introduction decision.Design/methodology/approachA game theory model is used to solve selling mode decision, that is whether transform the selling mode from the wholesale mode to the marketplace mode, and PB introduction decision, that is, whether introduce the PB.FindingsThe results show that for the NBM, under certain condition, the NBM's selling mode decision is not affected by the e-platform's PB introduction decision. High revenue-sharing rate is conducive only when the difference in consumer preference between the PB and the national brand (NB) is small. The NBM's risk aversion will improve the applicability of the marketplace mode. For the e-platform, high PB preference of consumers and risk-averse behavior of the NBM is not conducive to PB introduction. For the supply chain, scenarios that the NB monopolizes the market under the wholesale mode and PB introduction under the marketplace mode should be prevented. PB introduction under the wholesale mode will become the only equilibrium with the increase of risk aversion of the NBM. Finally, the authors extend the scenario that consumers prefer the PB and the e-platform is risk-averse enterprise and find that PB introduction under the wholesale mode is detrimental to the NBM but beneficial to the supply chain. The impact of consumers' PB preference on the e-platform's PB introduction is opposite to the basic model. The impact of the e-platform's risk aversion on game equilibrium is opposite to that of the NBM's risk aversion.Originality/valueThis paper is first to study selling mode decision and PB introduction decision when considering enterprises' risk-averse attitude.