Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to identify factors on property management level for analysing incentives for an effective property management in an outsourced setting.
Design/methodology/approach
This research is based on an interview study of a set of three real estate-owning companies and their contracted facility management companies’ property management teams.
Findings
The study concludes that the property manager within the facility management company is highly controlled by the contract between the real estate owner and the facility management company. However, this contract does risk the individual property manager to prioritise the wrong work tasks as she/he has to know exactly what to prioritise in each contract and consider in whose interest she/he performs each task, the real estate owner, her/him employer or the tenants.
Research limitations/implications
The research in this paper is limited to Swedish commercial real estate sector.
Practical implications
The insight in the paper is regarding how real estate owners create incentives for the facility management companies’ property management organisation and how that are perceived by the individual property manager.
Originality/value
It provides an insight regarding how the commercial real estate industry prioritises different work tasks and how incentives are created to enable effort.
Subject
Business, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous),Finance
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3. Ownership and size as predictors of incentive plans within Swedish real estate firms;Property Management,2011
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