Can common institutional ownership inhibit corporate over-financialization? Evidence from China

Abstract

PurposeCommon institutional ownership is a phenomenon that has extended throughout the capital markets in recent years and has a significant impact on business strategy decisions. The study intends to investigate the effect of common institutional ownership on corporate over-financialization and potential functioning mechanisms.Design/methodology/approachUsing panel data from Chinese-listed companies over the period of 2003–2021, the authors conduct regression models which controlled year-, industry- and regional fixed effects to explore the impact of common institutional ownership on corporate over-financialization.FindingsThis study concludes that corporate over-financialization may be prevented via common institutional ownership. The mechanism test suggests that common institutional ownership inhibits corporate over-financialization by improving internal control quality and enhancing financial flexibility. Besides, heterogeneity analysis shows that the inhibiting effect of common institutional ownership on corporate over-financialization is more pronounced in stability-oriented institutional investors and high financing constraints firms.Originality/valueThis paper makes a valuable contribution to the current studies on effective strategies to prevent enterprises from becoming overly financialized by recognizing common institutional ownership. Furthermore, this paper adds to the research on common institutional ownership’s economic consequences. Finally, this study provides management implications for how to optimize corporate governance structures, curb the financialization of entities in practice and promote the development of the real economy.