Abstract
PurposeThe purpose of this two‐part series is to consider the role of the “scientific method” (SM) in human understanding, questioning both its consistency in actual practice and its reasonableness as a system of philosophy and action.Design/methodology/approachPart 2 considers problems of inefficiency and inertia caused by the SM's collectivist, frequentist orientation.FindingsIt is argued that problems caused by the SM's frequentist framework may be avoided by a more individualist, Bayesian approach.Originality/valueThe two‐part series challenges certain aspects of the “scientific method” as employed in the practice of modern science.
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