Differential game analysis between government and waste incineration plants on the management of municipal solid waste classification

Abstract

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to study how the government stimulates incineration plants to participate in waste classification management, and how to adjust the subsidy strategy for them.Design/methodology/approachConsidering that the classification behavior of residents will produce herd effect, and waste classification can reduce the disposal cost of incineration plants, the authors constructed a differential game model between the government and waste incineration plants, and analyzed the input strategy of the government and incineration plants when they cooperate in the management of municipal waste classification.FindingsIncreasing the input level of supervision or raising subsidy price, the government can promote incineration plants to increase the input level of incentive. Moreover, from a long-term perspective, increasing the input level of supervision is more effective. Compared with government supervision, the method of incineration plants incentive can more effectively increase the amount of waste disposal. Furthermore, the government supervision and the incineration plants incentive have a positive interaction effect on improving the amount of waste disposal. Increasing the input level of incineration plants incentive or the level of waste-to-energy technology can increase the amount of waste disposal, and from a long-term perspective, increasing the level of R&D investment is more beneficial to increasing the amount of waste disposal.Originality/valueThe results are helpful to improve the investment in the management of waste classification, and also provide a certain theoretical basis for the government's subsidy policy for incineration plants, so as to reduce the financial pressure of the government.