Auditor switching and audit fee discounting: the Iranian experience

Abstract

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of auditor switching on audit fee discounting in Iran. The increased competition in the Iranian audit market following audit market liberalization in 2001 has resulted in a rapid increase in auditor switching and reduces the relative bargaining power of auditors compared to the clients. It is expected that auditor switching results in fee discounting because the relative bargaining power of an auditor (client) is likely to be at the minimum (maximum) point during the initial period of engagement. Since the increased bargaining power of a client in initial year seems to be different in the case of different type of auditor switching (from a state auditor to a private and from a private auditor to another), the magnitude of fee discounting is expected to be different. Design/methodology/approach The objective is tested using a sample of 1,022 firm-year observations between 2001 and 2010. This study applies the multivariate regression model using the first difference specification of audit fee as a dependent variable. Findings Multivariate analysis reveals that auditor switching results in 14 percent of fee discounting. In addition, the results show that 18 and 13 percent of fees discounting during the initial year of engagement arise from cases of auditor switching involving a change from state auditors to private auditors, and a change from one private auditor to another, respectively. The findings support bargaining power view explanation in relation to audit fees discounting in initial year engagement. Originality/value This study is the first to examine the impact of auditor switching (and analyzed different types of auditor switching) on audit fee discounting using the bargaining power view.