Abstract
PurposePulchronomics studies the economics of beauty. The purpose of this paper is to research CEO pulchronomics by examining whether a beauty premium exists in CEO compensation and whether this beauty premium is justified by differences in CEO performance.Design/methodology/approachThe authors calculate a facial attractiveness scores (FAS) based on facial symmetry, facial structure and the golden ratio. The authors then perform OLS regressions to examine the effect of CEO beauty on CEO compensation and firm performances.FindingsThe authors find that base salaries for attractive CEOs are higher than those for unattractive CEOs, but incentive pays for attractive CEOs are not different from those for unattractive CEOs. The latter is likely due to the fact that attractive CEOs do not outperform unattractive CEOs in operations, innovation, corporate social responsibility and financial reporting quality.Originality/valueSince the CEO beauty premium is not supported by the superior performance of attractive CEOs, this paper provides new evidence of appearance discrimination in CEO compensation.
Reference136 articles.
1. Stature, obesity, and portfolio choice;Management Science,2017
2. Does CEO Charisma matter? An empirical analysis of the relationships among organizational performance, environmental uncertainty, and top management team perceptions of CEO charisma;Academy of Management Journal,2006
3. Statistical theories of discrimination in labor markets;ILR Review,1977
4. Altonji, J. and Blank, R. (1999), “Race and gender in the labor market”, in Ashenfelter, O. and Card, D. (Eds), Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier, Amsterdam, Vol. 3C, pp. 3143-3259.
5. Founding-family ownership and firm performance: evidence from the S&P 500;Journal of Finance,2003
Cited by
2 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献