Reconciling the conflicting goals of privacy protection and competition policy through making platform use data saleable – an institutional perspective on data markets

Abstract

PurposeIt has become increasingly clear that the objectives of privacy and competition policy are in conflict with one another with regard to platform data. While privacy policies aim at limiting the use of platform data for purposes other than those for which the data were collected in order to protect the privacy of platform users, competition policy aims at making such data widely available in order to curb the power of platforms.Design/methodology/approachWe draw on Commons' Institutional Economics to contrast the current control-based approaches to ensuring the protection as well as the sharing of platform data with an ownership approach. We also propose the novel category of platform use data and contrast this with the dichotomy of personal/non-personal data which underlies current regulatory initiatives.FindingsWe find that current control- and ownership-based approaches are ineffective with regard to their capacity to balance these conflicting objectives and propose an alternative approach which makes platform data saleable. We discuss this approach in view of its capacity to balance the conflicting objectives of privacy and competition policy and its effectiveness in supporting each separately.Originality/valueOur approach clarifies the fundamental difference between data markets and other concepts such as data exchanges.