Overcoming bias in the comparison of human language and animal communication

Abstract

Human language is a powerful communicative and cognitive tool. Scholars have long sought to characterize its uniqueness, but each time a property is proposed to set human language apart (e.g., reference, syntax), some (attenuated) version of that property is found in animals. Recently, the uniqueness argument has shifted from linguistic rules to cognitive capacities underlying them. Scholars argue that human language is unique because it relies on ostension and inference, while animal communication depends on simple associations and largely hardwired signals. Such characterizations are often borne out in published data, but these empirical findings are driven by radical differences in the ways animal and human communication are studied. The field of animal communication has been dramatically shaped by the “code model,” which imagines communication as involving information packets that are encoded, transmitted, decoded, and interpreted. This framework standardized methods for studying meaning in animal signals, but it does not allow for the nuance, ambiguity, or contextual variation seen in humans. The code model is insidious. It is rarely referenced directly, but it significantly shapes how we study animals. To compare animal communication and human language, we must acknowledge biases resulting from the different theoretical models used. By incorporating new approaches that break away from searching for codes, we may find that animal communication and human language are characterized by differences of degree rather than kind.