Abstract
Public goods, ranging from judiciary to sanitation to parkland, permeate daily life. They have been a subject of intense interdisciplinary study, with a traditional focus being on participation levels in isolated public goods games (PGGs) as opposed to a more recent focus on participation in PGGs embedded into complex social networks. We merged the two perspectives by arranging voluntary participants into one of three network configurations, upon which volunteers played a number of iterated PGGs within their network neighborhood. The purpose was to test whether the topology of social networks or a freedom to express preferences for some local public goods over others affect participation. The results show that changes in social networks are of little consequence, yet volunteers significantly increase participation when they freely express preferences. Surprisingly, the increase in participation happens from the very beginning of the game experiment, before any information about how others play can be gathered. Such information does get used later in the game as volunteers seek to correlate contributions with higher returns, thus adding significant value to public goods overall. These results are ascribable to a small number of behavioral phenotypes, and suggest that societies may be better off with bottom-up schemes for public goods provision.
Funder
National Natural Science Foundation of China
Key Area Research & Development Program of Guandong Province
Key Research & Development Program of Shaanxi Province
Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities
Slovenian Research Agency
Sveučilište u Zagrebu
MEXT | Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
Sumitomo Foundation
Publisher
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Reference34 articles.
1. I. Kaul , P. Conceicao , K. Le Goulven , R. U. Mendoza , Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization (Oxford University Press, 2003).
2. Prisoner’s dilemma and public goods games in different geometries: Compulsory versus voluntary interactions;Hauert;Complexity,2003
3. A theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games
4. J. O. Ledyard , “Public goods: A survey of experimental research” in Handbook of Experimental Economics, J. H Kagel , A. E Roth , Eds. (Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 111–194.
5. What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World?
Cited by
22 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献