Abstract
This paper explores our proposal’s conceptual depth and implications for the hypothesis generation as conditional. To do so, we will contrast it mainly with reading passages from one of the paradigmatic presentations of hypothesis generation: the work of C.S. Peirce. Indeed, in his work, the notion of hypothesis gains a relevant place from a logical point of view. In particular, we will focus on (i) showing that “hypothesis” in Peirce can hardly be identified with just a section of the rule that subsumes the surprising case and (ii) we will show that the proposed hypotheses generation as conditionals allows for a complementary and enlightening reading of his idea of abduction.
Publisher
Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca
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