Abstract
In this paper, a theory of the contents of fictional names — names of fictional people, places, etc. — will be developed. The fundamental datum that must be addressed by such a theory is that fictional names are, in an important sense, empty: the entities to which they putatively refer do not exist. Nevertheless, they make substantial contributions to the truth conditions of sentences in which they occur. Not only do such sentences have truth conditions, sentences differing only in the fictional names they contain differ in their truth conditions. It is, after all, commonplace to note such things as, for example, thatBilbo Baggins is a hobbitis true, andSherlock Holmes is a hobbitis false, while acknowledging at the same time that neither Baggins nor Holmes exists. The central problem, therefore, is that of reconciling the emptiness of fictional names with their substantial contributions.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Cited by
14 articles.
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1. Notes;Between the Lines;2024-05-24
2. Glossary of Terms and Concepts;Between the Lines;2024-05-24
3. Conclusion;Between the Lines;2024-05-24
4. Truthfulness in Theatre;Between the Lines;2024-05-24
5. Subsumption in Theatre;Between the Lines;2024-05-24