Abstract
Abstract: In 1954, a devastating flood struck the entire Yangzi River basin, causing the first major natural disaster in the newly established People’s Republic of China (PRC). The young regime had just embarked on its First Five-Year Plan, aimed at achieving rapid economic development and industrialization. The flood swept across several provinces, displaced populations, and submerged farmlands, posing both a new challenge and an opportunity for the regime to shape the socioeconomic landscape of the affected regions. This article uses a localized perspective to examine how the rural society of Hubei Province, the hardest-hit area, responded to the disaster. The central government’s self-help doctrine delegated much power to local governments and communities. Local officials and rural cadres had considerable leeway in managing the relief campaign as they simultaneously followed the state macroeconomic policy of rural collectivization. The 1954 flood in Hubei Province serves as a case study that illustrates the complexities of disaster management in the early years of the PRC.