Conceptualising securitisation in the field of cyber security policy

Abstract

ObjectivesThis article will attempt to analyse securitisation theory to explore the discursive features of cyber security, using a multi-actor approach that considers the role of state and non-state actors in the creation and management of cyber security discourses.Material and methodsThe paper aims to assess the contribution of securitization theory to the understanding of both traditional and contemporary security policy issues. More specifically, it is an attempt to reflect on the identification of the challenges facing the modern state.ResultsGrowing dependence on digital technology is inevitable, making the future more threatening than the present. Cyber technology is inherently vulnerable and thus impossible to fully secure. The call for "greater security" becomes justified because the more a country depends on cyber technology, the more inevitable cyber threats become. They are consistently treated by government circles as a security challenge, meaning that the problem is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying action beyond the normal bounds of political procedure.ConclusionsAs some conclusion and conclusion, it is worth reiterating observations about the multi-stakeholder nature of cyber security and observations about the co-creation of this security by a wide range of actors representing different and in some cases conflicting interests. It can be argued that there is no single discourse on cyber security or cyber threats, and it is simplistic to assume that there is even a single discourse that represents every securitization actor, be it government or the private sector. This diversity explains why the assumption and logic of securitization theory can only apply to some, but not all, cyber security discourses.