The Extent to Which Critical Thinking Is Subject-Specific: Further Clarification

Abstract

In this response to McPeck’s reply to my paper, I briefly summarize my earlier essay, and make four major points: (a) that the vagueness of the concepts, domain, field, and subject, is a problem when subject specificity serves as a basis for prediction, though not necessarily when it serves as a slogan or a vague warning; (b) that the distinction between the subject matter of schools and the subject matter of everyday life is a viable one, though not the mutually exclusive one that McPeck seems to attribute to me; (c) that the distinction between topic and school subject serves to help avoid a tempting equivocation that starts with the premise that all thinking is about some subject; and (d) that “relatively narrow” general thinking abilities can be very broad in the range of their application, and that many, though perhaps obvious at times to some, are not trivial, because numerous people seem not to employ them in important situations. An underlying concern is McPeck’s apparent assumption that showing something (e.g., subject-matter knowledge) to be a necessary condition for critical thinking establishes that it is essentially a sufficient condition, or at least that all other things (e.g., general abilities) are unimportant. There is yet much research to be done before the basic issues can be resolved; I hope that this conceptual clarification will facilitate this research.