Self-Narrative, Affective Identification, and Personal Well-Being
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Published:2022-12-14
Issue:
Volume:
Page:1-17
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ISSN:2053-4477
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Container-title:Journal of the American Philosophical Association
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language:en
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Short-container-title:J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.
Author:
CHENG KATHERINE CHIEH-LING
Abstract
Abstract
The narrative view of personhood suggests that we as persons are constituted by self-narratives. Self-narratives support not only the sense of personal persistence but also agency. However, it is rarely discussed how self-narratives promote or hinder personal well-being. This paper aims to explore what a healthy self-narrative looks like. By reframing a famous debate between Strawson and Schechtman about narrative personhood, I argue that self-narratives can hinder our personal well-being when affective identification leads to inflexible self-images, illustrated with the examples of imposter syndrome and rationalization. Furthermore, I explore how having a healthy self-narrative is not about disengaging from one's personal past and future, but about fostering affective identification in ways that allow flexible self-images.
Funder
Ministry of Science and Technology, Taiwan
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)