Abstract
Abstract
According to a widely held view epistemic justification is a normative notion. According to another widely held assumption, epistemic justification comes in degrees. Given that gradability requires a context-sensitivity that normativity seems to lack, these two assumptions stand in tension. Giving up the assumption of gradability of justification represents a lesser theoretical cost.
Funder
Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
History and Philosophy of Science
Cited by
1 articles.
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1. Justification and gradability;Philosophical Studies;2023-05-31