Abstract
A puzzling feature of interwar Anglo-Indian economic relations is the contrast between Whitehall's relatively hands-off attitude to Indian tariff policies, and its insistent hands-on approach to monetary policy issues in the colony. Both sets of issues were, at various times, equally contentious. But while Britain's strategic objectives in India paved the way for the Fiscal Autonomy Convention, the road towards a similar monetary ‘convention’ was never taken. Rather, thanks to Britain's external financial problems, the interwar decades saw initially a tightening, and later a refinement, of London's control over Indian monetary policies. This paper hopes to set out the processes at work more clearly than has been attempted before, and to account for them. The interpretation offered here is consistent with the ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ explanation of British imperialism during the interwar years, and of the postwar de-colonization process.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Sociology and Political Science,History,Geography, Planning and Development
Reference117 articles.
1. Britain and India between the Wars
2. CCA, Grigg Papers 3/5, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 20 Aug. 1936.
3. CCA, Grigg Papers 3/10 has copies of the intercepted mail; Grigg's charges against Smith and his lady friend are also in this file.
Cited by
2 articles.
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