Abstract
The imposition of limited sanctions against Italy was given fair prospect of success by members of the League. Sanctions were to have a twofold purpose. One was to uphold the Covenant and encourage collective security. The other was to end the war by putting pressure on the Italian government so as to make it amenable to a negotiated settlement. It was expected that economic and financial measures (as opposed to military means) would be sufficient, over a period of time, to achieve this. The timetable was upset by unexpected political events and by the collapse of Ethiopian military resistance. Policies are explained, events discussed, and to illuminate some dilemmas a distinction (not then well perceived) is made between politically important “consumatory” assumptions and diplomatically operative “instrumentalist” and reconciliationist practices.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Law,Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management,Political Science and International Relations,Sociology and Political Science
Reference17 articles.
1. Documents diplomatiques frangais, 1932–1939, 2e sér. (1936–1939), t. I (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1963), p. 445.
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18 articles.
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