Abstract
The stability of stationary equilibria under genetic-algorithm
adaptation is studied
in an overlapping-generations economy with a
unique, monetary steady-state and two-period cyclic equilibria.
Agents use the genetic algorithm to update their
labor-supply decisions. The results of simulations and the analysis of the
dynamics
show that the two-period cycle is stable and that the
steady-state equilibrium is
unstable under genetic-algorithm
adaptation. The dynamics are driven primarily by
the wealth and
substitution effects that lead to the
algorithm's convergence to the two-period cycle.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Economics and Econometrics
Cited by
34 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献
1. Learning in a complex world: Insights from an OLG lab experiment;Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization;2024-04
2. Index;Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models in Political Science;2021-05-13
3. Bibliography;Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models in Political Science;2021-05-13
4. Conclusion;Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models in Political Science;2021-05-13
5. An Alternative Unification Framework;Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models in Political Science;2021-05-13