Abstract
We present two variations of a two-person, noncooperative stochastic game, inspired by the famous red-and-black gambling problem presented by Dubins and Savage. Two players each hold an integer amount of money and they each aim to win the other player's fortune. At every stage of the game they simultaneously bid an integer portion of their current fortune, and their probabilities of winning depend on these bids. We describe two different laws of motion specifying this dependency. In one version of the game, the players' probabilities of winning are proportional to their bets. In the other version, the probabilities of winning depend on the size of their bets and a weight parameter w. For each version we give a Nash equilibrium, in which the player for which the game is subfair (w ≤ ½) plays boldly and the player for which the game is superfair (w ≥ ½) plays timidly.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Applied Mathematics,Statistics and Probability
Cited by
8 articles.
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