Abstract
AbstractCicero claims that states were created for the protection of property, so a statesman should try to avoid levying property taxes. A contrary principle holds that, as long as the state is common to all, those who benefit from it most should compensate those who benefit least to maintain distributive justice. With this frame of reference, the article asks two related questions. First, to what extent does Cicero differ from Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Livy, and the Stoics, who describe compensation or common ownership as a principle of fiscal fairness? Second, how does Cicero's political theory reflect the misgivings of wealthy Romans about state power and redistribution in the absence of compensatory taxation from 167 to 43 b.c.e.? I argue that his interpretation of the Servian census entrenches the ‘pre-fiscal’ distribution of property in the Roman constitution, which compromises the impartiality of the state and weakens its ability to respond to fiscal crises.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Literature and Literary Theory,Archeology,Visual Arts and Performing Arts,History,Archeology,Classics
Reference121 articles.
1. Ulpian, Natural law and Stoic influence
2. The definition of “eques romanus” in the late Republic and early Empire;Wiseman;Historia,1970
3. Gabba, E. 1962: ‘Progetti di riforme economiche e fiscali in uno storico dell'età dei Severi’, in Studi in onore di Amintore Fanfani, vol. 1, Milan, 39–68.