1. On the crisis, its origins, effects and possible solutions, see, for example, George Cooper, The Origin of Financial Crises (Vintage Books 2008); Viral V. Acharya and Matthew Richardson, eds., Restoring Financial Stability — How to Repair a Failed System (Wiley, New York University Stern School of Business 2009); Vincent Dujardin, Yves De Cordt, Rafael Costa and Virginie de Moriamé, eds., La crise économique et financière de 2008–2009 (Peter Lang 2010); Olivier Pastré and Jean-Marc Sylvestre, Le roman vrai de la crise financière (Perrin, Collection Tempus 2008); Jacques Attali, La crise, et après? (Fayard 2008); Brian Rance, Tony Besse and Mark Finer, ‘The Credit Crisis and Moving Markets’, 4 Revue trimestrielle de droit financier / Corporate Finance and Capital Markets Law Review (2008) p. 6; Financial Services Authority, The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Financial Crisis, March 2009, at pp. 11–50; Report of the HighLevel Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (chaired by Jacques de Larosière), Brussels, 25 February 2009, at pp. 7–12; Sébastien Huyghe and Jean-Luc Warsmann, Rapport d’information sur les défaillances de la régulation bancaire et financière, 22 December 2009, Assemblée nationale No. 2208; Philippe Marini, Rapport d’information sur la crise financière et la régulation des marchés, Sénat No. 59, 21 October 2009.
2. For the German plan, see Alexander Glos, ‘German Financial Market Stabilisation Act and Financial Market Stabilisation Fund Regulation’, 4 Revue trimestrielle de droit financier / Corporate Finance and Capital Markets Law Review (2008) p. 32.
3. Dexia’s troubles which followed from the problems of its American subsidiary FSA Asset Management LLC resulted in substantial measures being taken by France, Luxembourg and Belgium. Thus, further to the substantial capital injection (€6.4 billion) which Dexia received from these three states, Act No. 2008-1061 of 16 October 2008 (Art. 6 IV) authorised the French government to grant Dexia and FSA a state guarantee for funds raised on financial markets between 9 October 2008 and 31 October 2010. However, this guarantee is only valid as long as Belgium and Luxembourg also respect their engagements; see Richard Parolai, Diane de Mouy, Bruno Fatier, Frédérick Lacroix and Camelia Dragan, ‘French Action Plan to Restore Confidence in the Banking System (Update)’, 4 Revue trimestrielle de droit financier / Corporate Finance and Capital Markets Law Review (2008) p. 18.
4. For a critical view of the reaction of public authorities to the crisis, see Alain Pietrancosta, ‘La crise financière, les biais cognitifs et le droit’ (editorial), 4 Revue trimestrielle de droit financier / Corporate Finance and Capital Markets Law Review (2008) p. 4.
5. Guillaume Maujean, ‘Bonus: Nicolas Sarkozy veut ériger Paris en “modèle” avant le G20 de Pittsburgh’, Les Echos, 26 August 2009; ‘Brown promet de limiter les bonus, réticent sur l’initiative française’, Les Echos, 1 September 2009; Bruno de Roulhac, ‘L’Europe se dirige vers un consensus modéré sur les bonus’, L’AGEFI, 2 September 2009; Florence Autret, ‘L’Union Européenne sert les rangs en vue du G20’, L’AGEFI, 3 September 2009; Patrick Jenkins and Brooke Masters, ‘Crackdown to Cut Bank Profits’, Financial Times, 9 September 2009; Gabriele Parussini, ‘Lagarde Pushes for New Rules on Bonuses’, The Wall Street Journal, 17 September 2009.