1. Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘The End of History in Corporate Law’, 89 Geo L. J. (2001) p. 439 at pp. 440–441 (arguing that academic, business and government elites now agree that “the managers of the corporation should be charged with the obligation to manage the corporation in the interests of its shareholders … and the market value of the publicly traded corporation’s shares is the principal measure of the shareholder’s interest”); see also R. Gordon Smith, ‘The Shareholder Primacy Norm’, 23 J. Corp. L. (1998) p. 277.
2. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd edn. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press 1996).
3. Kuhn’s book suggests humankind is a long way from completely understanding the universe, and in this sense all paradigms are to some extent social constructions and none are entirely “correct.” Kuhn nevertheless clearly believes some paradigms are better than others at predicting real phenomena. Microbes are a better explanation for disease than witches, and it is more correct to say the earth revolves around the sun than vice versa.
4. See, e. g., Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law (Boston, Mass., Little, Brown and Co. 1986) p. 17 (noting that U.S. corporate law fails to require directors to maximize shareholder wealth but stating this ought to be the corporate purpose).
5. Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’, 3 J. Fin. Econ. (1976) pp. 305–360.