Abstract
Globalization pressured a rebirth of the state
in Korea, but in an unexpected direction. Whereas
the welfare state retrenched in Western Europe
under pressures of the borderless global economy,
the Korean state reinvented itself into the
guardian of public welfare. That regime shift
occurred when the “Asian crisis” struck in 1997 to
end the developmental state's way of growth.
Previously, the state channeled subsidized bank
loans to the chaebol
firms (monopolistic conglomerates in strategic
industries) and the chaebol company welfare to its
workforce in order to secure industrial peace in
strategic growth sectors. This de facto class
bargain, partly forced by the developmental state
and chaebol firms and partly prodded by organized
labor, crumbled with the Asian crisis. No longer
too big to fail, the chaebol firms plunged into
downsizing and restructuring in order to raise
profitability, thus precipitating a profound
social crisis. The rules and norms of lifetime
employment and promotion by seniority gestated
during Park Chung Hee's authoritarian rule
(1961–1979), and labor's acquiescence—if not
consent—to the chaebol-led hypergrowth strategy
collapsed as the crisis damaged a third of Korea's
top thirty business conglomerates in 1997 and
1998.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Political Science and International Relations,Economics and Econometrics,Sociology and Political Science,Development
Reference27 articles.
1. Can the Welfare State Compete?
2. This is a revised version
of the paper presented at the “International
Conference on Globalization and Social Policy”
held at Brown University, October 1999. I am
deeply indebted to Miguel Glatzer, Dietrich
Ruschemeyer, and two anonymous readers for many
insightful comments and suggestions as I have
revised my analysis. This paper is financially
supported by Korea Research Foundation, Grant No.
B00113. Any errors or omissions, of course, are
mine alone.
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