Mobilization, Social Networks, and Turnout: Evidence from Japan
-
Published:1998-04
Issue:3
Volume:50
Page:447-474
-
ISSN:0043-8871
-
Container-title:World Politics
-
language:en
-
Short-container-title:World Pol.
Author:
Cox Gary W.,Rosenbluth Frances M.,Thies Michael F.
Abstract
The strategic elites model of turnout argues that elites mobilize more when the probability of their effort deciding the electoral outcome is greater. Although the literature assumes that this probability depends solely on how close the election is, logically it depends jointly on how many votes are needed to affect the outcome (closeness)andon how many additional votes elite efforts are likely to garner (vote yield). Because the vote yield of mobilizational effort varies with the social capital of the district that elites face, the level of elite mobilizational effort (hence turnout) should dependinteractivelyon closeness and social capital. The authors test their predictions using datafromJapanese lower house elections for the years 1967–90. Japan is an interesting test case both because its (former) electoral system differs from that for which the model was first developed and because the literature clearly stresses the role of elite mobilization through social networks but does not examine the particular hypotheses advanced here.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Political Science and International Relations,Sociology and Political Science
Reference47 articles.
1. “Tanaka ha assho Jiminto taihai no kozu”;Matsubara;Cbuokoron,1984
Cited by
69 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献